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Abstract 
 
This paper aims at establishing a relationship between disparity of information 
and the probability of speculative attack in explaining the Asian crisis. We apply 
the general framework of Markov-Switching models to the differential of interest 
rates (DIR), subsequently in Indonesia and Malaysia. We allow dependency of the 
transition probabilities over the asymmetric information indicators. 
The Maximum Likelihood estimators results (MLE) are twofold: (1) an increase 
of information dispersion among speculators leads to a higher probability of a 
currency crisis (2) there is a significant asymmetric impact of information 
disparity as measured by difference between fund price and Net Asset Value 
(NAV) on the transition probability in the case of Indonesia, while the hypothesis 
is rejected for Malaysia’s case. 
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1 Introduction 
Whether asymmetric information plays a role in currency crisis is an issue that has important 
implications for both the theoretical and empirical literature in international finance. The 
matter is critical. If for example, asymmetric information increases the probability of a 
speculative attack, the exchange rate regimes will be more vulnerable in periods of higher 
disparity of information and policymakers should adjust their policies accordingly, as 
underlined by Prati and Sbracia (2002, p.1)  
The Asian crisis has caused severe economic turbulence in the economies of South East 
Asia since July 1997, and has spread beyond the region to reach Russia and Brazil. The 
explanation of the Asian crisis has been the subject of much argument. There is no easy 
consensus to be reached on what they lay behind it. According to first generation models 
(Krugman (1979), Flood and Garber (1984)), currency crises are caused by insufficient 
foreign exchange reserves due to a persistent deficit in balance of payment and bad 
fundamentals. However, the second generation characterizes the currency crises as self-
fulfilling speculative attacks and they result in multiple equilbria. Ratti and Seo (2003)1 
provide some evidence of Korea being in zone of multiple equilibria and there having been 
self-fulfilling speculation at times during 1997 and 1999 using a non linear model. A new 
generation of currency crisis emphasizes financial sector weakness and investor behaviour. 
These models are called inter-generation models because they combine sequences of first and 
second generations. Krugman (1998) and Corsetti et al. (1998) explain the Asian crisis using a 
moral hazard model. As a response to the Asian crisis, international policy makers suggest 
that increased transparency could help to avoid specultative crashes. To date, there has been 
little empirical work on the role of asymmetric information in explaining currency crises, with 
the notable exception of three papers, namely Prati and Sbracia (2002), Metz (2003) and 
Tillmann (2004). While the two first papers study the impact of uncertainty about 
fundamentals on currency crisis, the third one uses a different approach. He analyses the 
impact of uncertainty that originates from private information among foreign exchange 
investors. He finds that information disparity raises the probability of speculative attack for 
the French Franc and Italian Lira in the EMS crisis of 1992. 
This paper focuses on the cases of Indonesia and Malaysia, and tries to separate the 
contributions of economic fundamentals from asymmetric information in explaining the 
speculative events.  
The paper is organized as follows; section 2 introduces the theoretical foundations 
related to the role of asymmetric information in a global game framework. Section 3 derives 
the testable implications of the latter inspired from Tillmann’s technical methodology and 
discusses the results of our estimates. Section 4 concludes. 
2 Theoretical basis 
This paper also related to the growing literature on global games and information aggregation 
in equilibrium outcomes such as Morris and Shin (1998).  
This section builds on the pioneering work of Morris and Shin (1998) and Heinemann 
and Illing (2002) who build up a reduced game to model currency attack under noisy private 
information. The authors suggest that changes in information structure of speculators can be 
explained by sudden movements in the probability of devaluation. Assuming that the 
information structure determines a unique θ *. When the precision of private information 
increases, the threshold below which a crisis occurs increases. 
                                                 
1
 Their results are supportive for the role played of both fundamentals and self-fulfilling beliefs in explaining 
currency crisis.  
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An empirical evidence of this central result that applies the higher order beliefs concept 
must include the information disparity as inducing change in the probability of speculative 
attack. However, linking global games framework to empirical finance seems not to be an 
easy task. That’s why adopting a methodology analogous to that of Tillmann, seems to be the 
most suitable approach for our purpose. 
3 Econometric modelling 
Market participants’ strategic behaviour has the potential to fuel and magnify market turmoil 
and even trigger financial crises. To capture and understand such pathologies, we propose to 
adapt the same empirical framework suggested by Tillmann (2004), to the Asian crisis 
context. Our specific empirical focus is on Indonesia and Malaysia. 
3.1 Data and model description 
In models of regime change, the regression parameters depend on an unobservable discrete 
variable whose realization is a Markov chain of first order. Iterative algorithms are used to 
estimate model parameters, which are based on Bayesian procedures. The Markov-switching 
models are very useful for modelling changes in the economic linkages and their interaction 
with economic fundamentals. They are particularly useful for identifying episodes of crisis 
and non crisis. Jeanne (1997) and Jeanne and Masson (2000), among others, use this 
framework to see if the attack incurred in the case of the EMS crisis was caused by a 
phenomenon of “sunspots”. 
The DIR of a country displays different behaviour during periods of “pressure” and 
“stable” periods. In order to capture this asymmetry, we apply a two-state Markov-switching 
model with time varying transition probabilities. Hamilton (1989, 1990) considered a simple 
version of Markov-switching with transition probabilities that are fixed (PTF). Later, Diebold 
et al. (1994) developed a Markov-switching with time-varying transition probabilities (PTV) 
in order to capture the systematic changes in the transition probabilities. The use of Markov-
switching models has the advantage that it can yield more accurate estimates of the process. 
The regime switching model combines two ore more sets of model parameters into one 
system. According to Moore and Wang (2009, p. 3), “it is argued that a discrete measure of 
crisis in probit models, which are frequently employed for the analysis of currency crises, 
leads to a loss of information on the scale of speculative pressure.” So, we don’t refer to those 
models in explaining the role of asymmetric information. In our case, there are two possible 
states of nature: “tranquil” (st=0) versus “crisis” (st=1) regime. The behaviour of our 
dependent variable DIRt is dependent on st whose density is given by: 
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Where itF is the fundamental i at time t, i=1, 2, 3. 
In equation (2), the interest rate differential between Indonesia or Malaysia, 
respectively, and United States is regressed on three macroeconomic fundamentals2 (see 
Table1 for details) whose effects are represented by the coefficients 1θ , 2θ  , and 3θ :  
                                  
                                                 
2
 The author acknowledges Wajih Khallouli for providing dataset on Asian fundamentals. 
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Where 
ts
m is a regime-specific intercept. The discrete variable st can shift between two 
realizations: 
                                                                1,0, == jjst                                                             (3) 
                                                        ijtt pisjsprob === − )/( 1                                                (4) 
All the transition variables are collected in the (2x2) transition matrix: 
                                               





−=
−=
=
110001
111000
          1
1                   
P
ppp
ppp
                                            (5) 
The transition probabilities are assumed to be time-varying by considering a logistical 
function: 
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Where iip  : is the probability of remaining in regime i at time t, ijp  is the probability of 
switching from regime i to j. The coefficient q1 (p1) represents the impact of the proxy on the 
probability of jumping from regime 0 (1) to regime 1 (0). We expect q1 to be negative, which 
means that more disparate information is, the more likely the probability of speculative attack 
is. Finally, ,iω is a proxy of information disparity among speculators. Following Tillmann 
(2004), we consider the same three measures of asymmetric information: 
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The difference between fund price and NAV is called premium or discount. This latter 
reflects the informational advantage of local investors over foreign ones. The evidence of 
privileged information by local investors has been enhanced by Frankel and Schmuckler 
(1996, 2000) who have examined the dynamics of premia for the case of the Mexican crisis in 
1994 and the Asian crisis in 1997. In fact, Indonesia and Malaysia followed Thailand by free 
floating their exchange rates on August 14 and July 14, respectively.  
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Finally, the estimator of maximum likelihood is given by the expression: 
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3.2 Results and discussion 
This study uses monthly data for Indonesia and Malaysia over the period 1990: 3 through 
2001: 3 and 1987: 5 through 2001: 3, respectively. The choice of the period is restricted by 
the Dataset on fundamentals provided and the availability of country funds data. These latter 
were gathered from http://www.etfconnect.com/ web site. 
The EM-algorithm was performed using R2.6.0 software3. In this subsection, we discuss the 
estimating results of the MS model with fixed transition probabilities and of the MS with time 
varying transition probabilities.   
 
Markov switching with fixed transition probabilities 
 
From these results, we can draw the following observations: 
First, in order to identify which regime is more persistent, we need to interpret the probability 
estimates. The estimates of transition probabilities oop and 11p are both highly significant in 
the two East Asian countries. The probabilities of staying in regime 0 (the values are about 
0.98) are bigger than the probabilities of staying in regime 1 (the values are about 0.94 and 
0.97, respectively).    
 
Markov switching with time varying transition probabilities 
 
Results from estimating the non-linear maximum likelihood model are given in Tables 1.1 
and 2.1. As can be seen, the coefficients of the three macroeconomic fundamentals are 
statistically significant for the case of Indonesia, and a little bit for Malaysia. They have also 
the expected signs. The regime-switching intercepts are highly significant. It is clear that the 
linear approach is strongly rejected in both cases against the Markov-switching model as 
shown in table 1.2 and table 2.2 which report the results of Wald specifications tests for 
equality for the regime dependent coefficients. The null hypothesis of equal intercept terms 
across regimes is rejected at high levels of significance for both countries, mirrored by the 
value of likelihood ratio (LR4). In most cases, the impact of iω is negative as measured by the 
coefficient q1 which means that disparate information raises the probability of a currency 
crisis. However, only the first disparity of information measure seems to have a significant 
asymmetric impact on the transition probability (Indonesia). The same test fails to detect any 
significant asymmetric impact for the other measures.   
                                                 
3
 The author is grateful to Atsushi Matsumoto for providing R program on Markov-switching available on his 
webpage: http://www.geocities.jp/atsmatsumoto/index.html. Some modifications were done in order to fit our 
model specification. 
4
 LR=-2(Lc-Lnc) where Lc and Lnc are Max L. for constraint and non constraint models, respectively. 
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Other empirical works that studied PTV models for the exchange market pressure, 
namely Cerra and Saxena (2002) tried to test the contagion effect on the Indonesia’s currency 
crisis from the neighbouring countries (Thailand, Korea). Similarly, Abiad (2003) used PTV 
models for the Asian crisis but he hardly found any significant impact of fundamentals on the 
exchange market pressure. All these papers analysed the impact on the exchange market 
pressure, in our knowledge this paper is the first to study the combined effect of fundamentals 
and asymmetric information on the differential of interest rates but applied to the context of 
Asian crisis. 
 
4 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have investigated the role of information disparities in the case of Asian 
crisis. We particularly focused on two East Asian countries, namely, Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Our framework imitates Tillmann (2004). Country funds premia are used to approximate the 
dispersion of information among investors. We find that disparate information raises the 
probability of a currency crisis, with a significant asymmetric impact on the probability of 
transition, hardly depicted only for the case of Indonesia. This paper relates to the role that 
transparency plays in currency crisis models. It will be more interesting to investigate the 
impact of disparate information on the probability of speculative attack in other East Asian 
countries (i.e. Thailand, Singapore, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Philippines). On step in this 
direction might be modelling DIR as a Markov- switching process for panel data. This will 
depend upon availability data on country funds. There may be also scope for an empirical 
verification of multiple factors crisis as in Cerra and Saxena (2002). Future research may be, 
then, seeing which of the following factors, namely, fundamentals, contagion or asymmetric 
information that the most determines the Asian currency crisis. 
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A. Tables 
 
 
 
 
Table 1- Fundamentals per country and expected signs 
 
 Notation Indonesia Malaysia Expected 
sign 
Current account as a percentage of 
GDP 
cagdp yes  - 
Domestic Credit Growth dcrg yes yes + 
Real gross domestic product growth rgdpg  yes - 
Temporary component of real 
exchange rate 
treer yes yes ? 
Note: treer=actual real exchange rate-Hodrick Prescott filter 
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Table 1.1- Linear and Markov switching results: Indonesian case 
 
Markov-switching 
PTV 
   
Linear 
1
tω  
2
tω  
3
tω  
PTF 
 
m  
20,31157*** 
(0,59865) 
    
 
( )0=tsm
 
 26,004*** 
(0,65424) 
20,312*** 
(0,58914) 
22,239*** 
(0,50596) 
26,043*** 
(0,655664) 
 
( )1=tsm
 
 17,1529*** 
(0,49114) 
5,0106*** 
(350,043) 
-0,822881 
(2,2381) 
17,083*** 
(0,48246) 
 1θ  -81,25916*** (17,60637) 
-57,326*** 
(12,337) 
-81,2777**** 
(17,339) 
-113,33*** 
(13,638) 
-59,353*** 
(12,125) 
 2θ  -150,22697*** (10,53189) 
-126,61*** 
(7,7468) 
-150,23*** 
(10,348) 
-180,78*** 
(8,6133) 
-124,68*** 
(7,8168) 
 3θ  0,20654*** (0,05067) 
0,19548*** 
(0,041097) 
0,2056*** 
(0,055164) 
0,05658 
(0,048457) 
0,18461*** 
(0,040191) 
 σ  5,091 3,3789*** 
(0,21172) 
5,0137*** 
(0,30749) 
3,8198*** 
(0,2374) 
3,2721 
(0,21112) 
 
00p  
     
0,981357 
 11p      0,9350268 
 0p   3,5714*** (0,83953) 
3,1482 
(77,355) 
-3,4055 
(3,6863) 
3,9623*** 
(0,72759) 
 0q   5,5632 (3,9388) 
11,595 
(35,157) 
5,3357*** 
(1,6983) 
2,6666*** 
(0,67565) 
 1p   0,25121 (0,54468) 
4,9846 
(596,58) 
461,25 
(371,1) 
 
 1q   -2,0861 (2,3847) 
4,9921 
(582,45) 
27,61 
(62,098) 
 
Sample 1990 : 3 - 2001 : 3 
 Max L -410,7232 -362,7761 -403,14054 -374,1851 -363,55635 
Note: Asterisks refer to significance level: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
 
 
 
Table 1.2- Wald test Results: Indonesia 
 
 ( )( )120 χH  1tω  2tω  3tω  PTF 
 ( ) ( )10 === tt smsm  95,89425***  15,16532***  73,07619***  94,3337*** 
 11 qp = 5 23,95169*** -2,617626 e-06 1,491540   
Note: Asterisks refer to significance level: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 H0 : the impact is symmetric 
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Table 2. 1- Linear and Markov switching results: Malaysian case 
 
Markov-switching 
PTV 
  
 
Linear 
1
tφ  2tφ  3tφ  
PTF 
 
m  
-0,12012 
(0,41517) 
    
 ( )0=tsm   -1,3572*** (0,25823) -1,3432*** (0,24897) -1,3492*** (0,25616) -2,7836*** (0,28589) 
 ( )1=tsm   3,7318**** (0,33013) 3,7533*** (0,31715) 3,7227*** (0,32941) 1,9063*** (0,26772) 
 1θ  16,221***    (2,32648) 
13,756*** 
(1,5001) 
13,61*** 
(1,4746) 
13,579*** 
(1,4756) 
20,003*** 
(1,5693) 
 2θ  -5,41371    (4,57014) 
-5,0382* 
(2,7821) 
-5,2924** 
(2,6566) 
-5,2646* 
(2,7517) 
2,3917 
(2,9212) 
 3θ  -0,04849    (0,04810) 
0,050862* 
(0,030734) 
0,054317* 
(0,02999) 
0,054568* 
(0,030043) 
0,052789* 
(0,031127) 
 σ  2,693 1,5358*** 
(0,084927) 
1,5286*** 
(0,083822) 
1,536*** 
(0,08498) 
1,5551*** 
(0,085734) 
 
00p  
     
0,9827272 
 11p      0,967428 
 0p   3,1965***  (0,84463) 
4,4528*** 
(1,4316) 
2,9302*** 
(0,724) 
3,39119*** 
(0,63930) 
 0q   4,2394***  (0,7316) 
5,1718*** 
(1,1198) 
4,739*** 
(1,0726) 
4,0412*** 
(0,74114) 
 1p   -0,45105 
 (0,4739) 
-2,5056* 
(1,6796) 
3,2268 
(9,8805) 
 
 1q   -0,16666  (0,31772) 
-3,8572** 
(1,6058) 
-8,3788 
(7,509) 
 
Sample 1987 : 5 – 2001 : 6 
 Max L -407,62044 -326,61923 -323,54842 -326,42895 -330,48011 
Note: Asterisks refer to significance level: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
 
 
Table 2. 2- Wald test results: Malaysia 
 
 ( )( )120 χH  1tω  2tω  3tω  PTF 
 ( ) ( )10 === tt smsm  162,0024*** 168,1440*** 162,3830***  154,2807*** 
 11 qp =  0,2584267 0,2059565 1,022133   
Note: Asterisks refer to significance level: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
